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Abstract— In this paper we show how attackers can covertly 
leak data (e.g., encryption keys, passwords and files) from 
highly secure or air-gapped networks via the row of status 
LEDs that exists in networking equipment such as LAN 
switches and routers. Although it is known that some network 
equipment emanates optical signals correlated with the 
information being processed by the device ('side-channel'), 
intentionally controlling the status LEDs to carry any type of 
data ('covert-channel') has never studied before. A malicious 
code is executed on the LAN switch or router, allowing full 
control of the status LEDs. Sensitive data can be encoded and 
modulated over the blinking of the LEDs. The generated signals 
can then be recorded by various types of remote cameras and 
optical sensors. We provide the technical background on the 
internal architecture of switches and routers (at both the 
hardware and software level) which enables this type of attack. 
We also present amplitude and frequency based modulation and 
encoding schemas, along with a simple transmission protocol. 
We implement a prototype of an exfiltration malware and 
discuss its design and implementation. We evaluate this method 
with a few routers and different types of LEDs. In addition, we 
tested various receivers including remote cameras, security 
cameras, smartphone cameras, and optical sensors, and also 
discuss different detection and prevention countermeasures. 
Our experiment shows that sensitive data can be covertly leaked 
via the status LEDs of switches and routers at a bit rates of 10 
bit/sec to more than 1Kbit/sec per LED. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The air-gap in network security refers to a situation where the 
computer network is physically separated from other networks. 
In particular, air-gapped network are carefully kept isolated 
form less secure and public networks such as the Internet. 
Today, air-gapped networks are widely used in military defense 
systems, critical infrastructure, the financial sector, and other 
industries [1] [2]. The air-gap isolation is maintained by 
enforcing strict policies in the organization. These policies 
include forbidding external unsecured devices and media from 
connecting to the network and using advanced intrusion 
detection and prevention systems to eliminate intentional and 
accidental security breaches. A publicly known example of an 
air-gapped network is the Joint Worldwide Intelligence 
Communications System (JWICS), a top secret classified 
network (Top Secret/SCI) belonging to the United States' 
Defense Intelligence Agency [3]. JWICS is used to transmit 
classified documents between the Department of Defense, 
Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, and 
Department of Justice.  
A. Breaching air-gapped networks 
In the past decade it has been shown than even air-gapped 
networks are not immune to breaches. In order to penetrate such 
networks, attackers have used complex attack vectors, such as 
supply chain attacks, malicious insiders, and social engineering 
[4]. Using these methods, attackers can penetrate an air-gapped 
network, while bypassing defense measures including firewalls, 
antivirus programs, intrusion detection and prevention systems 
(IDS/IPS), and the like. In 2008, a classified network of the 
United States military was compromised by a computer worm 
named Agent.Btz [4]. According to the reports [5], a foreign 
intelligence agency supplied infected thumb drives to retail 
kiosks near NATO headquarters in Kabul. The malicious thumb 
drive was put into a USB port of a laptop computer that was 
attached to United States Central Command. The worm spread 
further to both classified and unclassified networks. Stuxnet [6] 
is another well publicized example of an air-gap breach, and 
other attacks have also been reported [7] [8] [6] [9] [10].    
B. Leaking data through an air-gap 
After obtain a foothold in an air-gapped network, the attacker 
may, at some point, wish to retrieve information from the 
compromised network. For example, an attacker may want to 
leak encryption keys, keylogging information, or specific files, 
behaviors commonly used in espionage APTs (Advanced 
Persistent Threats). While infiltrating air-gapped systems has 
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been shown feasible, the exfiltration of data from systems 
without Internet connectivity is a challenging task. Over the 
years, various out-of-band communication channels have been 
proposed. These communication channels allow attackers to 
leak data from network-less computers. When such 
communication is also covert, it is typically referred as air-gap 
covert channels. Air-gap covert channels use various types of 
radiation emitted from computer hardware components. 
Exploiting electromagnetic radiation is a type of covert channel 
that has been studied for at least twenty years. In this method, a 
malware controls the electromagnetic emission from computer 
parts, such as LCD screens, communication cables, computer 
buses, and other hardware peripherals [11] [12] [13] [14] [15]. 
Leaking data over audible and inaudible sounds [16] [17] and 
via heat emission [18] have also been studied in recent years.  
Leaking data via the hard drive activity LED [19], keyboard 
LEDs [20], and screen power LEDs [21] was also proposed. In 
these optical methods, data is modulated over the blinks of 
LEDs in such a way that it can be received optically by remote 
cameras. Notably, most of the methods are not considered 
completely covert, since they can easily be detected by people 
who notice the anomalous LED blinking.  
C. Our contribution    
In this paper, we examine the threat of leaking data from 
air-gapped networks via the row of LEDs that exists in network 
equipment such as switches and routers1. The contributions of 
our research are threefold.  
Novel technical discussion. The concept of leaking data by 
controlling the network equipment LEDs has never been 
studied before. Although it is known that network equipment 
are emanating optical signals correlated with the information 
being processed by the device [20], intentionally controlling the 
status LEDs to modulate and carry data has never studied 
before. We introduce two types of attacks: firmware level 
attacks in which malware is installed within the firmware of a 
network switch or router, and software level attacks in which 
the malware controls the LEDs from a compromised computer 
within the network.  
 
Increased Bandwidth. Our measurements show that the by 
using the router status LEDs, malware can exfiltrate data at a 
rate of more than 1000 bit/sec per LED. We show that the 
bandwidth can be increased further when multiple LEDs are 
used. This rate allows the exfiltration of files, keylogging data, 
and encryption keys relatively quickly. 
 
The Successful Use of Optical Sensors. We examine and 
evaluate the use of optical sensors as part of the attack. Optical 
sensors are used to measure the light levels and can be sampled 
at very high rates, hence allowing reception of data at a higher 
bit rate than standard cameras. We discuss the characteristics of 
optical sensors and the appropriate modulation method for this 
                                                          
1 In this paper we refer to networking equipment (LAN 
switches and routers) as routers. 
type of receiver. We also evaluate various types of cameras, 
including remote cameras, 'extreme' cameras, security cameras, 
smartphone cameras, and drone cameras.   
  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 
II we present related work. Section III describes the adversarial 
attack model. Technical background is provided in Section IV. 
Data transmission is discussed in Section V and the 
implementation in Section VI. Section VII presents the 
evaluation and results. Countermeasures are discussed in 
Section VIII, and we present our conclusions in Section IX. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
The general topic of covert channels used by malware has been 
extensively studied for more than twenty years. In order to 
evade the detection of firewalls and IDS and IPS systems, 
attackers may hide the leaked data within legitimate Internet 
traffic. Over the years many protocols have been investigated 
in the context of covet channels, including TCP/IP, HTTPS, 
SMTP, VOiP, DNS requests, and more [22]. Other types of 
covert channels include the timing channel in which the attacker 
encodes the data with packet timing [23], and image 
steganography [24] in which the attacker embeds the data into 
an existing image. A sub-topic of covert channels focuses on 
the covert leakage of data from air-gapped computers, where 
Internet connectivity is not available to the attacker. Air-gap 
covert channels, which can be categorized as electromagnetic, 
acoustic, thermal, and optical channels, have been the subject 
of academic research for the past twenty years.  
A. Electromagnetic, acoustic and thermal 
In electromagnetic covert channels, the electromagnetic 
emission generated by various hardware components within the 
computer is used to carry the leaked information. Kuhn and 
Anderson [12] presented an attack ('soft-tempest') involving 
hidden data transmission using electromagnetic waves 
emanating from a video cable. The emission is produced when 
crafted images are transmitted to the screen. In 2014, Guri et al 
introduced AirHopper [11] [25], a type of malware aimed 
bridging the air-gap between computers and a nearby mobile 
phone by exploiting FM radio signals emanating from the video 
card. In 2015, Guri et al presented GSMem [15], a malware that 
can generate electromagnetic emission at cellular frequencies 
(GSM, UMTS, and LTE) from the memory bus of a PC. This 
study showed that data modulated over the emission can be 
picked by a rootkit residing in the baseband firmware of a 
nearby mobile phone. USBee [26], presented in 2016 by Guri 
et al, used the USB data bus to generate electromagnetic signals 
and modulate digital data over these signals. Similarly, 
Funtenna [27] utilized the general GPIO buses of embedded 
devices to generate electromagnetic signals. Other types of 
magnetic covert channels are discussed in [28] and [29]. 
Hanspach introduced a method called acoustical mesh networks 
in air, which enables the transmission of data via high frequency 
sound waves [16]. They used laptop speakers and microphones 
for the transmission and reception. The concept of 
communicating over inaudible sounds has been studied in [30] 
and was also extended for laptops and mobile phones. In 2016, 
Guri et al presented Fansmitter [31] and DiskFiltration [32], 
two methods enabling exfiltration of data via sound waves, 
even when the computers are not equipped with speakers or 
audio hardware. This research show how to utilize computer 
fans and hard disk drive actuator arms to generate covert sound 
signals. 
BitWhisper, presented in 2015, exploits the computers’ heat 
emissions and the PC thermal sensors to create a so-called 
thermal covert channel [33]. This method enabled bidirectional 
covert communication between two adjacent air-gapped 
computers.  
B. Optical 
In 2002, Loughry and Umphress discussed the threat of 
information leakage from optical emanations [20]. In particular, 
they showed that LED status indicators on various 
communication equipment carries a modulated optical signal 
correlated with information being processed by the device. In 
Appendix A they presented the threat of using the keyboard 
LED for data exfiltration and were able to achieve a 
transmission bit rate of 150 bit/sec for each LED with an 
unmodified keyboard. In the same way, Sepetnitsky and Guri 
presented the risks of intentional information leakage through 
signals sent from the screen power LED [21].  The main 
drawback of these methods is that they are not completely 
covert: given that the keyboard and screen LEDs don’t typically 
blink, it is possible for users to detect the communication. 
Recently, Lopes presented a hardware based approach for 
leaking data using infrared LEDs maliciously installed on a 
storage device [34]. By blinking the infrared LEDs, malware 
can leak sensitive data stored on the device at a speed of 15 
bit/sec. Note that their approach requires the attacker to deploy 
the compromised hardware in the organization. In 2017, Guri et 
al presented a method codenamed LED-it-GO [19], which 
enables data leakage from air-gapped networks via the hard 
drive indicator LED which exists in almost any PC, server, and 
laptop today. They showed that a malware can indirectly 
control the hard drive LED at a rate of 5800 Hz which exceeds 
the visual perception capabilities of humans. VisiSploit [35] is 
an optical covert channel in which data is leaked through a 
hidden image projected on an LCD screen. With this method, 
the 'invisible' QR code that is embedded on the computer screen 
is obtained by a remote camera and is then reconstructed using 
basic image processing operations. Brasspup [36] demonstrated 
how to project invisible images on a modified LCD screen. His 
method is less practical in a real attack model, since it requires 
physically removing the polarization filter of the targeted LCD 
screen. 
Table 1 summarizes the different types of existing air-gap 
covert channels and presents their maximum bandwidth and 
effective distance. Unlike previous work, this study focuses 
entirely on the network equipment LEDs (switches and routers) 
as a leaking medium, a threat that has not been studied before. 
We examine the boundaries of this technique on different types 
of network equipment and evaluate it with various types of 
cameras and optical sensors as receivers. With one LED we 
achieved an exfiltration speed of more than 1000 bit/sec per 
LED. 
III. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK MODEL 
As a typical covert channel our adversarial attack model 
consists of a transmitter and a receiver. The transmitter in our 
case is a network switch or router in which the data is exfiltrated 
via its LEDs. The receiver is a remote camera or optical sensor 
which record the LEDs signals. Following we briefly discuss 
the relevant consideration in a context of the attack model. 
A. The transmitter 
As part of the attack model the attacker must execute malicious 
code within the targeted router to enable control of the status 
LEDs. We present two types of attacks that can be used for this 
purpose: (1) modifying the firmware on a router, and (2) 
Method  Bitrate Type 
AirHopper [11] [25]  (graphic card, video cable) 
GSMem [26]  (RAM-CPU bus) 
USBee [27] (USB bus) 
Funthenna [13] (GPIO) 
480 bit/sec 
1 to 1000 bit/sec 
4800 bit/sec 
N/A 
Electromagnetic 
[17] [16] [30] [32] [39] (speakers) 
Fan noise (Fansmitter) [33] (computer fans) 
Hard disk noise (DiskFiltration) [32] (Hard-Disk Drive) 
<100 bit/sec 
0.25 bit/sec 
3 bit/sec 
Acoustic 
BitWhisper [35] (CPU, PC heat sensors) 1-8 bit/h Thermal 
Hard Drive LED (LED-it-GO) [19] 
Visisploit (invisible pixels) 
Keyboard LEDs  [20]  
Screen LEDs [21] 
Implanted infrared LEDs [36] 
Switches/Routers (the current research) 
15 - 4000 bit/sec 
< 100 bit/sec 
150 bit/sec 
20 bit/sec 
15 bit/sec 
10 - 1000 bit/sec (per LED) 
Optical 
Table 1. Different types of air-gap covert channels and their bitrate 
 
executing a malicious script or shellcode on an unmodified 
router.  
Firmware modification. In this type of attack the adversary 
has to infect a router with a malicious firmware. This firmware 
contains additional code to control the LEDs and encoding a 
data over it.  The Infection of a router can be achieved via 
supply chain attacks, social engineering techniques, or the use 
of hardware with preinstalled malware [37] [38] [39].  Notably, 
in recent years there have been several cases in which routers 
have been infected with malicious code as a part of an attack. 
In 2014, the Guardian published an article that stated that some 
network devices were infected by a backdoor before they were 
delivered to the customer [40].  
Remote code execution. In this case, the targeted router doesn't 
have to be infected with a malicious firmware. Instead, it is 
controlled remotely (e.g., from a compromised computer within 
the network) via standard remote management channels such as 
SSH and telnet or by exploiting certain vulnerabilities in the 
router. The transmitting code is then uploaded to the router in 
the form of a shellcode or a shell script. Hijacking routers 
remotely is a common type of attack that has been demonstrated 
many times in recent years [38] [41]. Other types of flaws and 
remote code execution vulnerabilities in routers have been 
found in the wild [42] [43]. For example, in 2017, Cisco found 
a new critical zero-day vulnerability that affects more than 300 
of its switch models. The vulnerability on the Cisco IOS and 
Cisco IOS XE software, allows remote attackers to remotely 
execute malicious code on the device and gain root privileges 
to take full control of the device [44].   
 
B. The receiver 
The receiver is a digital camera or optical sensor which has a 
line of sight with the compromised router’s LED panel. There 
are several types of equipment that can play the role of the 
receiver in this attack model: (1) a hidden camera that has a line 
of sight to the transmitting router, (2) a high resolution camera 
which is located outside the building but positioned so it has a 
line of sight with the transmitting router, (3) a video 
surveillance, closed-circuit TV, or IP camera positioned in a 
location where it has a line of sight with the transmitting 
computer [45], (4) a malicious insider, also known as the evil 
maid [46], carrying a smartphone or wearable video camera 
(e.g., hidden camera [47] ) that can position him/herself so as to 
have a line of sight with the transmitting router, (5) an optical 
sensor capable of sensing the light emitted from the router 
LEDs. Such sensors are used extensively in VLC (visible light 
communication) and LED to LED communication [48]. 
Notably, optical sensors are capable of sampling LED signals 
at high rates, enabling data reception at a higher bandwidth than 
a typical video camera. An example of the air-gap covert 
channel is provided in Figure 1 in which data is encoded in 
binary form and covertly transmitted over a stream of LED 
signals. A hidden video camera films the activity in the room, 
including the router and LAN switch LEDs. The attacker can 
then decode the signals and reconstruct the modulated data. 
 
IV. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
There are different types of network devices and LEDs. A 
typical network switch includes two LEDs for each LAN port: 
the link LED and the status/mode LED. The link LED usually 
indicates that the port is currently enabled and receiving data 
from a connected network device. The status/mode LED 
displays various information about the connection such as mode 
(half/duplex) and speed (100Mb, 1 GB, etc.). In many types of 
routers and network switches there are additional custom LEDs 
for internal fault alerts, fan speed monitoring, and test displays 
[49]. The most prevalent LED colors in network devices are 
green and orange, but other colors also in use [49].  
A. Hardware Level 
At the hardware level, typical network switches and routers 
consist of an embedded computer with several network 
controller interfaces. The network interfaces are connected to 
the main computation unit (via a system bus), in which the 
traffic is routed and processed. Switches mainly operate in the 
 
Figure 1. The attack illustration. Data is encoded in binary form and covertly transmitted over a stream of LED signals emitted from 
a router or LAN switch. 
frames of the data link layer (layer 2), and hence consist of less 
powerful hardware (CPU, RAM, etc.), than those of routers, 
which operate on packets in the network layer (layer 3). The 
device LEDs and button are controlled via GPIO pins connected 
to the device's PCB (printed circuit board).  
The circuit in Figure 2 is a common driver circuit used for router 
LEDs. The GPIO ports in the microcontroller are based on open 
collector BJT (Bipolar Junction Transistor) transistor. The 
LEDs are connected to power supply throw the R1 resistor, 
which limit its maximum forward current. The R and 
R2 resistors functions as voltage dividers and provide the 
voltage DC working point of the LEDs. The LEDs' blinking 
speed can reach couple of MHz. The LED's maximal blinking 
speed depend on its physical characteristics, the parasitic 
capacitance, the galvanic connection to the board, and software 
or hardware limitations at the controller level. 
Microcontroler 
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R
 LED
Signal 
Input 2R
1R
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 LED
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Figure 2. The hardware microcontroller led driver schematics 
 
B. OS Level 
There are various proprietary and open-source operating 
systems for network devices. For example, the Cisco IOS is a 
Linux based operating system used on most of Cisco's s routers 
and network switches [50]. The Juniper Network Operating 
System, Junos OS is a FreeBSD based operating system that is 
used in Juniper Networks’ routers and security devices [51]. 
Open-source operating systems for network devices include the 
OpenWrt, DD-WRT, and others [52].  
C. LED Control 
In most Linux based OSs, the GPIOs are exported to the user 
space processes via the GPIO sysfs memory mapped entries. 
Controlling the status LEDs from a user space is fast enough for 
most of the applications needs, but still has an overhead of 
invoking system calls and the context switching from user space 
to kernel space. When faster access is required, the 
corresponding GPIOs can be controlled from a kernel driver by 
directly accessing the I/O pins [53]. Note that sometimes the 
status LED pins are multiplexed such as they are directly 
controlled by the hardware. In these cases the corresponding 
GPIOs must be demultiplexed (via a kernel driver) before the 
can be controlled by a software.   
V. DATA TRANSMISSION 
In this section we discuss the data transmission and describe 
various modulation methods, along with their implementation 
details. Note that the topic of visible light communication has 
been widely studied in the last decade. In particular, various 
modulations and encoding schemes have been proposed for 
LED to LED communication [48] [54] [55]. For our purposes, 
we present basic modulation schemes and describe their 
characteristics and relevancy to the attack model. As is typical 
in LED to LED communication, the carrier is the state of the 
LED, and the basic signal is generated by turning the router 
LEDs on and off. For convenience, we denote the two states of 
an LED (on and off) as LED-ON and LED-OFF, respectively. 
A. Data modulation 
We present four basic modulation schemes: (1) on-off keying 
(OOK) – with a single LED, (2) Binary Frequency-Shift Keying 
(B-FSK) – with a single LED, and (3) Manchester Encoding – 
with a single LED, and (4) ]Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK) – 
with multiple LEDs. 
1) On-Off Keying (OOK) - single LED  
On-Off keying is the simplest form of the more general 
amplitude-shift keying (ASK) modulation. The absence of a 
signal for a certain duration encodes a logical zero ('0'), while 
its presence for the same duration encodes a logical one ('1'). In 
our case, LED-OFF for duration of 𝑇𝑜𝑓𝑓  encodes '0' and LED-
ON for a duration 𝑇𝑜𝑛 encodes '1.' Note that in the simple case 
𝑇𝑜𝑛 = 𝑇𝑜𝑓𝑓 . In its basic form, this scheme uses a single LED to 
modulate data. The OOK encoding is described in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. On-Off-Keying (OOK) modulation 
Logical bit Duration LED state 
0  𝑇𝑜𝑓𝑓  LED-OFF 
1 𝑇𝑜𝑛 LED-ON 
2) Binary Frequency-Shift Keying (B-FSK) - single LED 
Frequency-shift keying (FSK) is a modulation scheme in which 
digital information is modulated through frequency changes in 
a carrier signal. In binary frequency-shift keying (B-FSK) only 
two frequencies, usually representing zero and one, are used for 
the modulation. In our case, LED-ON for duration of 
𝑇𝑜𝑓𝑓  encodes logical '0' and LED-ON for a duration 𝑇𝑜𝑛 
encodes logical '1.' Note that in the simple case 𝑇𝑜𝑛 = 𝑇𝑜𝑓𝑓 . We 
separate between two sequential bits by setting the LED in the 
OFF state for time interval 𝑇𝑑. In its basic form, this scheme 
uses a single LED to modulate data. The B-FSK encoding is 
described in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Binary Frequency-Shift Keying (B-FSK) modulation 
Logical bit Duration LED state 
0 𝑇𝑜𝑓𝑓  LED-ON  
1 𝑇𝑜𝑛 LED-ON 
Interval  𝑇𝑑 LED-OFF 
 
3) Manchester Encoding - Single LED 
In Manchester encoding each logical bit is modulated using a 
transition in the physical signal. The sequence of physical 
signals '01' (LED-OFF, LED-ON) encodes a logical '0' and the 
sequence of physical signals '10' (LED-ON, LED-OFF) 
encodes a logical '1.' Manchester encoding’s transfer rate is half 
that of OOK, since it uses two physical signals for each logical 
bit. This type of encoding is considered more reliable because 
of the redundancy of each transmitted bit and it is heavily used 
in communication. The Manchester encoding is described in 
Table 4. 
Table 4. Manchester encoding, single LED 
Logical bit Duration LED states 
0  𝑇𝑜𝑛    𝑇𝑜𝑓𝑓  LED-ON, LED-OFF 
1 𝑇𝑜𝑓𝑓      𝑇𝑜𝑛 LED-OFF, LED-ON   
 
4) Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK) - Multiple LEDs 
In this scheme we use several LEDs to represent a series of bits. 
As in the OOK encoding, the absence of a signal for a certain 
time duration encodes a logical zero ('0') for a specific LED, 
while its presence for the same time duration encodes a logical 
one ('1') for a specific LED. In the case of multiple LEDs, all 
LEDs remain in the same status for a duration of 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑙  and then 
change to the next state. This encoding is relevant for cases 
where several LEDs in the router are available for the 
transmission (e.g., a case in which some LAN ports are 
available). We separate between two sequence of bits by setting 
the all LED in the OFF state for time interval 𝑇𝑑. The ASK 
encoding for a case of eight LEDs is described in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK), multiple LEDs 
Logical 
bits 
Dur
atio
n 
OS operation (𝒏=8) 
 (0x00) 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑙 LED1 = OFF, LED2= OFF, …, LED𝑛 = OFF 
 (0x01) 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑙 LED1 = ON, LED2 = OFF, …, LED𝑛 = OFF 
 (0x02) 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑙 LED1 = OFF, LED2 = ON, …, LED𝑛 = OFF 
… 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑙 … 
 (0xFF) 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑙 LED1 = ON, LED2 = ON, …, LED𝑛 = ON 
Interval  𝑇𝑑 LED1= OFF, LED2 = OFF, …, LED𝑛 = OFF 
 
B. Bit Framing 
The data is transmitted in a small packets called frames. Each 
frame is composed of a preamble, a payload, and a checksum 
(Table 6).  
Table 6. Bit framing 
Preamble  Payload  Checksum 
8 bit 256 bit 16 bit 
 
The preamble consists of a sequence of eight alternating bits 
('10101010') and is used by the receiver to periodically 
determine the properties of the channel, such as 𝑇𝑜𝑛 and 𝑇𝑜𝑓𝑓  
(or the 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑙  in case of multiple LEDs). In addition, the preamble 
header allows the receiver to identify the beginning of a 
transmission and calibrate other parameters, such as the 
intensity and color of the transmitting LED. The payload is the 
raw data to be transmitted. In our case, we arbitrarily choose 
256 bits as the payload size. For error detection, we add a CRC 
(cyclic redundancy check) value, which is calculated on the 
payload and added to the end of the frame. The receiver 
calculates the CRC for the received payload, and if it differs 
from the received CRC, an error is detected. More efficient bit 
framing may employ variable length frames, error correction 
codes, and compression, which are eliminated from our 
discussion for simplicity. 
  
VI. IMPLEMENTATION 
To evaluate the covert channel we implement a transmitter for 
the OpenWrt operating system [56]. The OpenWrt is an open-
source Linux based OS, used on embedded devices such as 
routers, gateways, and handheld devices. It supports many type 
of routers from a wide range of vendors including Cisco, 
Linksys, D-Link, and others [57]. Using OpenWrt, we were 
able to develop the LED control module and test it on different 
types of hardware. Note that the OpenWrt source-code includes 
many extra features such as advanced routing, firewalling, 
tunneling, and load balancing. 
A. LED Control 
In Linux, the hardware LEDs may be accessed from the kernel 
space driver or user space process [58]. The kernel space driver 
can directly access the appropriate GPIO pins in order to turn 
the LEDs on and off. Such low-level implementation is device 
specific and requires compilation of the LED driver for the 
specific target hardware. The LEDs are also exposed to user 
space processes through the /sys/class/leds entries. The 
entry /sys/class is exported by the kernel at run time, 
exposing the hierarchy of the system abstraction, in order to 
keep it generic enough to be tested on different hardware. 
/sys/class/leds/ contains the properties of each LED, 
such as name and brightness level. Note that most LEDs don't 
have hardware brightness support, and hence the brightness 
value represents only two states (ON / OFF). In addition to the 
/sys/class/leds directory, the kernel may also expose the 
GPIO interface to the user space through sysfs via the 
/sys/class/gpio/directory [59].  
Algorithm 1    ModulateOOK 
1: procedure ModulateOOK(nLED, data, T) 
2: openLED(nLED);             //opens the LED file for writing 
3: while(data[i] !=0) 
4:     if(data[i] == ‘0’)          //modulate 0 by turning the LED off 
5:         setLEDOff(nLED);  
6:     if(data[i] == ‘1’)         //modulate 1 by turning the LED on 
7:         setLEDOn(nLED); 
8:     i++;             
9:     sleep(T);                        // sleep for time period of T 
10: closeLED(nLED);           // closes the LED file descriptor 
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode for the simplest case of 
OOK modulation. The ModulateOOK procedure receives the 
target LED number (nLED) to modulate the data on, an array 
of data to transmit, and the bit duration (T). The LED's 
brightness file is opened in line 1. The algorithm iterates on the 
data array and extracts the current bit. If the bit to transmit is '0' 
then the LED is turned off for time period T (line 5). If the bit 
to transmit is '1' the LED is turned on for time period T (line 7). 
We present the implementation only for the OOK modulation; 
Manchester encoding, FSK, and the ASK with multiple LEDs 
are omitted for simplicity.  
B. Shellscript  
We also implemented a version of the transmitter which 
requires no persistency within the router firmware. In this 
version, a compromised computer within the network is 
connecting to the target router though a standard remote 
connection such as telnet or SSH, or by exploiting a 
vulnerability from the network. The attacker then executes the 
transmitting shellcode or script that controls the router LEDs. 
Note that this type of malware is not persistent and will not 
survive a router reset. We used a router with a standard DD-
WRT firmware that has a telnet server. After connecting to the 
router from a computer in the network, we execute a script 
which controls the LEDs and modulates the data. The basic 
LED control commands used by our script are shown below.      
// Method #1 
// turn the LED on 
1: echo 0 > /sys/class/leds/led_name/brightness 
// turn the LED off  
2: echo 255 > /sys/class/leds/led_name/brightness  
// Method #2 
3: echo 1 > /proc/gpio/X_out  // turn the LED on 
4: echo 0 > /proc/gpio/X_out          // turn LED off 
 
Note that we used two different methods to control the LEDs. 
In the first method the LED directory /sys/class/leds/ 
exported by the kernel is used, and in the second method the 
GPIO interface /proc/gpio/ is used. The names of the 
directory and files may vary between different devices and OSs. 
Moreover, a router may not expose the LEDs and GPIO 
interface to the user level (e.g., the appropriate driver has 
disabled or removed). In this case, the attacker has to execute a 
kernel level shellcode which directly controls the GPIOs.  
 
VII. EVALUATION 
In this section we evaluate the optical covert channel. Our 
evaluation focuses on the optical characteristics of router LEDs 
and the transmission rate. In our experiments we adapt the 
approach commonly used in visible light communication 
(VLC), which assumes a line of sight between the light source 
and the camera [20] [54]. We implemented a prototype of the 
previously described transmitter on three types of routers that 
are shown in Table 7. Note that all of them are Wi-Fi routers, 
and hence are not the typical devices installed on air-gapped 
networks. However, our goal is to evaluate the characteristics 
of router LEDs as a medium for a covert channel, so the type of 
router is less relevant.  
 
Table 7. The tested routers 
# Router # of LEDs 
R1 TL-WR841N (TP-LINK) 
white 
7 + 1 (the power 
LED) 
R2 TL-WR941ND (TP_LINK) 
yellow 
8 + 1 (the power 
LED) 
R3 AC1750 or Archer c7 
(Archer) black 
8 + 1 (the power 
LED) 
 
For the evaluation we used the Linux DD-WRT and Linux 
OpenWrt operating systems. A list of the LED control sysfs 
entries exposed by the kernel and the on/off values of the LEDs 
are provided in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. The tested routers’ OS control 
# Entry On/off values Firmware 
R1 /sys/class/leds/
<led_name>/brigh
tness 
0xFF / 0x00 
0x00 / 0xFF  
(depend on the 
LED) 
DD-WRT 
(version 
3.18.48) 
R2 /sys/class/leds/
generic_<led>/br
ightness 
0xFF / 0x00 OpenWrt 
(Version 
3.18.23) 
R3 /sys/class/leds/
tp-
link:green:name/
brightness 
0x00 / 0xFF DD-Wrt 
(version 
3.18.48) 
 
A. Camera receviers 
There are two types of receivers relevant to the attack model: 
cameras and light sensors. Receiving the optical signals by a 
camera depends on the line of sight and visibility of the router 
LEDs. After receiving the recorded video, the attacker has to 
process the video in order to detect the location of each 
transmitting LED. The video is processed frame by frame to 
identify the LED status (on or off) of each frame. Finally, the 
binary data is decoded based on the encoding scheme. The main 
factor in determining the maximum bit rate for video cameras 
is the number of frames per second (FPS). In our experiments, 
we identified two to three frames per bit as the optimal setting 
needed to successfully detect the LED transmissions. Table 9 
show the maximal bit rate when various types of video cameras 
are used as receivers.  
 
Table 9. Maximum bit rate of different receivers 
Tested 
Camera/Sensor 
FPS Max bit rate 
(per LED) 
Eight LEDs 
Entry-level DSLR  
(Nikon D7100) 
60 15 bit/sec  120 bit/sec 
High-end security 
camera  
(Sony SNCEB600) 
30 15 bit/sec  120 bit/sec 
Extreme camera  
(GoPro Hero5) 
60 - 
240 
100-120 bit/sec 800-960 
bit/sec 
Webcam (HD)  30 15 bit/sec 120 bit/sec 
(Microsoft 
LifeCam) 
Smartphone camera  
(Samsung Galaxy 
S6) 
30 - 
120 
15-60 bit/sec 120-
480bit/sec 
Wearable camera  
(Google Glass 
Explorer Edition) 
30 15 bit/sec 120  
bit/sec 
B. Light sensor receivers 
A photodiode is a semiconductor that converts light into 
electrical current. To evaluate the transmissions at high speeds, 
we built a measurement setup based on photodiode light sensors 
(Figure 3). The Thorlabs PDA100A light sensor [60] (Figure 
3,a) is connected to an internal charge amplifier and a data 
acquisition system (Figure 3,b). We also used an optical zoom 
lens to focus the sensing area and reduce the optical noise. The 
data is sampled with the National Instruments cDAQ portable 
sensor measurement system [61] via a 16-bit ADC NI-9223 
card [62] which is capable of 1M samples per second. The light 
emitted from the transmitting router (Figure 3,c) is sampled by 
the sensor and processed by a MATLAB DSP program (Figure 
3,d).  
 
Figure 3. The measurement setup with the Thorlabs PDA100A 
light sensor and NI-9233 data acquisition hardware 
 
1) Blinking frequency 
In this experiment we tested the maximum frequency at which 
the router LEDs can blink when controlled from a user space 
program or shellcode running within the router's OS. The 
blinking frequency is important, since it defines the maximal 
speed of the basic signal carried by the LED. 
 
  
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Raw signal
Filtered signal
Time (msec)
S
e
n
s
o
r 
a
m
p
lit
u
d
e
 (
m
V
)
S
e
n
s
o
r 
a
m
p
lit
u
d
e
 (
m
V
)
 
Figure 4. Maximal blinking frequency (R1) 
 
Figure 4 shows the signals received from R1 when its leftmost 
LED is repeatedly turned on and off. The sampling rate in this 
test is 500K samples per second. As can be seen, the minimal 
LED-ON time is ~120µs. The minimal blinking time (LED-
ON, LED-OFF) is ~700µs which implies a bit rate of 1400 
bit/sec in the simplest OOK modulation. During the LED-ON 
time the sampled amplitude is approximately 14mV, while for 
LED-OFF the time is 4mV (generated by the ambient light in 
the room). The blue line is the raw sampled signal, and the red 
line is the signal smoothed with the Savitzky-Golay filter [63]. 
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Figure 5. Maximal blinking frequency (R2) 
 
Figure 5 shows the signals received from R2 when its leftmost 
LED is repeatedly turned on and off. As can be seen, the 
minimal LED-ON time is ~190µs. The minimal blinking time 
(LED-ON, LED-OFF) is ~290µs which implies a bit rate of 
3450 bit/sec with the simplest OOK modulation. During the 
LED-ON time the sampled amplitude is approximately 30mV, 
while for LED-OFF the time is 6.14V. As can be seen in Figure 
5, the room's backlights are flickering at 500 Hz (the dashed 
line).   
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Figure 6. Seven LEDs blinking at maximal frequency (R1) 
 
a bc d
Figure 6 shows the signals received from R1 when all seven 
LEDs are repeatedly turned on and off. By using all of the LEDs 
together for modulation, we significantly increase the optical 
signals emitted from the transmitting router. This method can 
be used when the optical signal generated by a single LED is 
too low for successful reception. As can be seen, with multiple 
LEDs the minimal blinking time (LED-ON, LED-OFF) is 
~240µs which implies a bit rate of 4000 bit/sec at the simplest 
OOK modulation. 
 
2) Amplitude Modulation 
With a camera receiver it is possible to distinguish between two 
or more different transmitting LEDs. In this case the bit rate is 
derived from the number of LEDs available for modulation. 
That is, with 𝑁 LEDs we can generate 2𝑁 different signals. 
Unlike camera receivers, light sensors can only measure the 
amount of light emitted from the router and not distinguish 
between different LEDs. One straightforward strategy is to use 
OOK modulation when 0 is modulated with all of the LEDs in 
the OFF state, and 1 is modulated with all of the LEDs in the 
ON state. Obviously, this type of modulation limits the 
transmission rate. We found that under some circumstances it 
is also possible to distinguish between different amounts of 
light emitted when using different number of LEDs, even with 
a light sensor. Consequentially, we are able to increase the bit 
rate by modulating multiple bits with several LEDs (using ASK 
modulation) when a light sensor is used for reception. Under 
optimal conditions 𝑛 different amplitudes can modulate 
𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑛) values. 
 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 shows eight amplitude levels as measured 
from R1 when all seven LEDs are in use. We employ eight 
different states, starting with all seven LEDs in the off state and 
sequentially turning the LEDs on until all of the LEDs are on 
(0000000, 1000000, 1100000… 1111111). 
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Figure 7. Eight amplitudes modualted by seven  LEDs, 10ms per 
amplitude  (R1) 
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Figure 8. Eight amplitudes modulated by seven LEDs, 300µs per 
amplitude (R1) 
 
Note that we only distinguish between the numbers of LEDs 
turned on, as opposed to their location (e.g., the states 1100000, 
0110000, and 0011000 represent the same amplitude). As can 
be seen in Figure 8, we can distinguish between eight different 
levels, when each amplitude level is modulated over 300µs. 
This implies a rate of ~3.3K levels per second or 10000 bit/sec. 
In Figure 8 the blue line is the raw sampled signal, and the red 
line is the signal smoothed with the Savitzky-Golay filter [63]. 
 
3) Transmission 
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Figure 9. OOK modulation with one LED (R2) 
 
Figure 9 shows the measurements in which 32 bits 
(010110111011100100111011011010) are transmitted 
from R2 using the OOK modulation via a single LED. The 32 
bits were transmitted in 9ms which implies a bit rate of 3555 
bit/sec. The bit error rate (BER) measured in this case was under 
5%. 
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Figure 10. ASK modulation (R2, two LEDs) 
 
Figure 10 shows the measurements in which 32 bits 
(010110111011100100111011011010) are transmitted 
from R2 using the ASK modulation via two LEDs. The 32 bits 
were transmitted in 9ms which implies a bit rate of 3555 bit/sec. 
Note that the 32 bits are encoded with three amplitude levels 
(L0, L1, and L2). The BER measured in this case was again 
under 5%. 
 
VIII. COUNTERMEASURES 
Prevention and detection are the two main types of 
countermeasures targeted at emanation based data leakage.  
Prevention. Common countermeasures may include policies 
aimed to restrict the accessibility of network equipment by 
placing it in classified rooms where only authorized staff may 
access it. Typically, all types of cameras are banned from such 
secured rooms. The NATO TEMPEST standards such as the 
NATO SDIP-27 (levels A/B/C) and SDIP-28 define classified 
zones which refer to the perimeter needed to prevent accidental 
or intentional leakage of signals [64] [65] [66] [67]. In these 
areas, the presence of surveillance cameras may serve as a 
deterrence measure. However, as mentioned previously in the 
attack model, the surveillance camera itself may be 
compromised by a malware [68] [45]. A less elegant 
countermeasure against LED attacks is to cover the status LEDs 
with black tape to physically block the optical emanation [20]. 
Covering the switch and router LEDs may affect user 
experience, for example, when testing the device or checking 
its functionality. Device and cable shielding is another common 
countermeasure recommended by the NATO standards to 
address other types of TEMPEST attacks, particularly 
electromagnetic TEMPTEST attacks. A special window film 
that prevents optical eavesdropping may be installed [69]; note 
that this type of countermeasure doesn't protect against insiders 
attacks, or cameras located within the building. Another 
approach is to interrupt the emitted signals by intentionally 
invoking random LED blinking. In this way, the optical signal 
generated by the malicious code will get mixed up with random 
noise. Implementing such a noise generator within an 
embedded device requires the involvement of OEMs and may 
also affect the usability of the LEDs. 
Detection. Technological countermeasures may include the 
detection of the presence of malware that triggers the router 
status LED. Mitigating firmware level attacks involves 
detecting (statically or dynamically) whether the firmware of a 
router has been compromised. Although the detection of 
firmware attacks has been studied in the recent years [70], most 
solutions focus on detecting the attack in the network traffic. 
Detecting an already compromised firmware installed within an 
embedded device such as a switch or router is still a challenging 
task [71]. The comparison of the device firmware with a clean 
image to identify malicious changes has been proposed [72], 
however extracting the device firmware is not always possible. 
More recently, Guri et al. proposed using the device's JTAG 
debugging interface to extract the memory for security purposes 
[71]. Such a method is considered invasive and involves 
opening the device for physical forensic investigation, and 
hence it is not a practical scalable solution. Addressing a 
software level attack in which the network device is 
compromised via a computer within the network is possible 
using conventional intrusion detection and prevention 
techniques. This type of signature and behavioral based defense 
has been shown to be limited in detecting zero-day and 
advanced attacks [73]. Another possible countermeasure is 
monitoring the router LEDs in order to detect covert signaling 
patterns. Again, practical implementation would be difficult, 
because most network device LEDs routinely blink due to 
frequent traffic activity. Consequentially, this kind of external 
monitoring solution would likely suffer from a high rate of false 
alarms.  
The countermeasures are summarized in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. List of countermeasures 
Type Countermeasure Limitations 
Prevention Zoning, camera banning, 
and area restriction 
Insider threats (e.g., 
cameras in the 
building and 
insiders) 
Prevention LED covering Degradation of 
functionality and 
user experience  
Prevention Window shielding High price 
Prevention  Signal jamming Requires OEM 
intervention,  
Degradation of user 
experience  
Detection LED activity monitoring 
(external camera) 
Price, false alarms 
Detection Firmware forensic 
extraction and investigation 
(e.g., JTAG). 
Technical 
challenges (e.g., 
extracting the 
device image), 
invasive operation 
Detection  Malicious traffic detection 
(software attack) 
Limited detection 
rate (e.g., zero-day 
and advanced 
attacks) 
 
 IX. CONCLUSION 
Network devices (e.g., LAN switches and routers) typically 
include activity and status LEDs in various sizes and colors. 
Such LEDs are used for monitoring the traffic activity, 
providing alerts in cases of hardware or software failure, testing 
the device, and so on. We show that these LEDs can be 
controlled by a malicious code which runs on the device. In a 
typical attack model, data such as files, encryption keys, and 
keylogging data is encoded and modulated over the LED’s 
blinking patterns. An attacker with a remote camera or optical 
sensor with a line of sight with the transmitting equipment can 
receive the data and decode it back to a binary information. We 
examine the internal architecture of network switches and 
routers at the hardware and software level and show how their 
LEDs can be controlled programmatically by accessing the 
corresponding GPIO controls. We developed a prototype of the 
transmitter using open-source firmware (OpenWRT and DD-
WRT) and tested it on three different home routers. We 
investigate the covert channel with different types of receivers, 
including digital cameras and optical sensors. We also discuss 
different detection and prevention countermeasures. Our 
research shows that data can be exfiltrated from an air-gapped 
network via switch and router LEDs at a bit rate of tens to 
thousands of bits per second per LED, depending on the type of 
receiver and the number of LEDs in use.  
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